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IN TBE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OP OTAH, 1 
Plaintiif-Respondent, i 
V. 1 
RICK N. PURSIFELL, : 
Defendant-Appellant, i 
t Case No. 860361 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to appoint 
substitute counsel where Defendant failed to articulate a 
conflict of interestf a complete breakdown of communication or an 
irreconcilable conflict? 
2. Has trial counsel ineffective for failing to make 
or choosing not to make certain objections or pretrial motions? 
JUEiSDICIiQfl 
This appeal is from convictions of burglary, a second-
degree felony? attempted burglary, a third-degree felony; 2 
counts of vehicle burglary, class A misdemeanors; and 2 counts of 
theft, class B misdemeanors. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal under Otah Code Ann* S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987)• 
£TAI£tt£HI_QE_Ifl£-CAS£ 
Defendant, Rick N. Pursifell, was charged with 
burglary, a second-degree felony; attempted burglary, a third-
degree felony; 2 counts of vehicle burglary, class A 
misdemeanors; and 2 counts of theft, class B misdemeanors* 
Defendant was convicted of the charged offenses in a 
jury trial held May 29, 1986, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Dtah, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. Judge Frederick sentenced 
defendant on June 2, 1966, to the statutory terms on all six 
counts to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to a 
0 to 5 term imposed in a prior conviction. 
Respondent accepts the Statement of Facts presented in 
Appellant's brief. 
I. The trial court properly refused to appoint 
substitute counsel where defendant did not demonstrate a conflict 
of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an 
irreconcilable conflict when the trial court gave him the 
opportunity to articulate his reasons for displeasure with 
counsel. When the court decided not to appoint alternate 
counsel, it was not required to ask defendant if he wanted to 
proceed pro se or inform him of that right. It was defendant who 
should have requested that he be allowed to represent himself for 
the court was not required to presume from his general request 
for substitute counsel that defendant wanted to waive counsel. 
!!• Trial counsel was not ineffective merely because 
she could have made objections that she chose not to make or 
overlooked. Because none of the matters complained of by 
defendant prejudiced him, counsel's performance reached at least 
the minimum requirements of competent counsel who identified with 
defendant and his defense. 
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EDIIJ-1 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REPOSED TO 
APPOINT A DIFFERENT DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
Defendant was represented at trial by Frances Palacios 
of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association. On the first day 
of trial, defendant expressed displeasure with Ms. Palacios 
stating that he did not "wish to proceed with Ms. Palacios.••" 
but not specifying what he wished to do in the alternative. 
Judge Frederick questioned defendant about the matter and 
determined that Ms. Palacios would continue representing 
defendant. On appeal, defendant argues that he should not have 
been forced to proceed with unacceptable counsel, that the trial 
court did not inquire into his objection thoroughly, and that the 
court did not inform him of his option to proceed pro se. 
Therefore, he asserts, the court violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel and committed reversible error. As argued 
below, the triad court's decision was correct and defendant is 
not entitled to reversal of his conviction. 
At the outset, the State agrees that a criminal 
defendant has the right to appointed counsel if indigent, the 
right to self representation and the right to effective counsel 
as defendant notes. £££ £Asu £JtAJte-SU-Hfiad# 648 P.2d 71, 91-92 
(Utah 1981). The issue here is not whether defendant was 
entitled to these rights, but whether the action of the trial 
court in continuing Ms. Palacios as defense counsel denied 
defendant any of these rights. 
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Defendant suggests that the t r i a l court should have 
appointed new counsel for him when he expressed h i s d i sp leasure 
with c o u n s e l ' s performance* However, even the cases c i t e d by 
defendant do not support h i s c la im. These cases indicate that a 
defendant seeking s u b s t i t u t e counsel must show good cause for the 
replacement, ££SBl£-J^_H.aI]S£I, 133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306 
(1976); McKfifi_XA_flALlis, 649 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir . 1981) , and that 
the t r i a l court must inquire into the bas i s for the defendant's 
c l a i m s , Uni££a_S£flies_X*_fl3JLt# 557 F.2d 162 (8th Cir . 1977); 
HUiifi-Y^-HUiifif 602 F. Supp. 173 (W.D.Mo. 1984); flui£lLJU-S*a±«# 
651 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); Cfli£ea_££a££S_XA_H£l£x# 674 
F.2d 185 (3rd Cir . 1982) . 
The trial court in this case did inquire into the cause 
of defendant's displeasure with counsel (R. 97) and defendant did 
not establish good cause for replacing Ms. Palacios. Defendant 
merely complained that counsel did not tell him about a hearing 
on a discovery motion before the hearing date and stated that he 
thought she should have told him about the discovery request and 
the hearing prior to filing it (R. 97-99) .* This complaint did 
not establish that defendant and defense counsel were "embroiled 
in irreconcilable conflict- requiring appointment of new counsel. 
£££ Hfifidf 648 P.2d at 92. What was established was that 
defendant did not understand the discovery process and the result 
was that defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge explained 
* Notably, there was no hearing on defendant's discovery request 
because the State provided everything defendant requested prior 
to the hearing d a t e . (R. 99-100.) 
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to defendant what occurred during discovery• Defendant did not 
allege that the discovery request was inadequate or the response 
incomplete nor did he complain about counsel's pre-trial 
investigation nor her preparation tor trial nor her proposed 
trial strategy. In fact, defendant did not even hint at anything 
that would have alerted the court to complaints other than the 
discovery complaint he expressly articulated. Defendant clearly 
failed to establish a "conflict of interest, a complete breakdown 
of communication or an irreconcilable conflict" and was not, 
therefore, entitled to substitute counsel. £}£&££, 649 F.2d at 
931, fiU&UH9 Uniififl^iflifiS^x-CalSbtfi* 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2nd 
Cir. 1972). 
Defendant, however, would also require that the trial 
judge must go further and inform him that in lieu of proceeding 
with counsel, be may choose to represent himself. The case 
defendant cites for this proposition does not inflict such a 
stringent rule. UniJt£fl_£iflJ;£S_3U_Belia, 674 F.2d 185 (3rd Cir. 
1982), aside from holding that a trial judge must make "at least 
some inquiry as to the reason for the defendant's dissatis-
faction," also states that once the inquiry is complete and the 
request denied, "the court can then BtflBfillX insist that the 
defendant choose between representation by his existing counsel 
and proceeding pro se." Id* at 187-188. itelty does not stand 
for the proposition that a court must in something analogous a 
Miranda-type warning inform defendant of his right of self-
representation. This is clear when the facts of HfiLty are 
examined. There, Welty asked the court to allow him to seek 
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private counsel to replace appointed counsel or to proceed pro 
se. The court, believing this was a delaying tactic, told Welty 
he could keep appointed counsel or proceed pro se without asking 
about the basis of the request and without explaining the dangers 
of representing oneself* 
The Third Circuit in making the statements quoted above 
was merely pointing out that a defendant could not be forced to 
make the choice Welty made without the trial court first 
determining by inquiry that there was no reason to appoint 
substitute counsel. In this case, defendant was allowed to state 
the reason for his unhappiness with appointed counsel as required 
but, significantly, defendant never requested to represent 
himself. Thus, the court was not required to warn him of the 
dangers inherent in self-representation nor was it required to 
address the question of self-representation at all where 
defendant never raised the issue. 
In a similar case, the Fifth Circuit required a 
criminal defendant to explicitly inform the trial court that he 
wished to proceed pro se clearly and unequivocally before the 
trial court must consider that option. M£££nfi_3U_£s££ll£# 717 
F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1983). The court stated: 
Moreno's stated reasons for this request were 
that his counsel had failed to carry out 
certain unspecified requests and that she was 
not "helping" him; not that he wished to act 
as his own attorney. We cannot infer from 
the defendant's general request to the court 
to dismiss his attorney that he desired to 
waive counsel and continue the trial pro se. 
Nor does the trial judge have an obligation 
to personally inform the defendant of his 
right to represent himself in such 
circumstances. 
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Id* at 175 (citation omitted). 
Because the trial court made a proper inquiry into the 
reasons for defendant's request for substitute counsel and 
because defendant's reason was insubstantial, the trial court 
here properly denied defendant's request. Moreover, the trial 
court was not required to offer defendant the alternative of 
proceeding pro se. Consequently, the trial court's ruling should 
be upheld and defendant's conviction affirmed. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective 
because she "barely presented a defense." Be enumerates defense 
counsel's alleged failings as: (1) not objecting to hearsay 
evidence; (2) not objecting to a witness' reference to another 
•robber"; (3) no pretrial challenge to defendant's initial 
detention; (4) no pretrial motion to suppress the show-up 
identification of defendant as suggestive; (5) not questioning 
why no fingerprints were taken; and (6) failure to impeach a 
witness with a prior inconsistent statement. Based upon 
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, defendant requests a new 
trial. 
Regardless of defendant's complaints, counsel's 
performance in this case was, nevertheless, constitutionally 
sufficient under the applicable standards. 
[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants only a fair trial and a competent 
attorney. It does not insure that defense 
counsel will recognize and raise every 
conceivable constitutional claim. 
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Ensl£-XA_Isafl£, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982) . "Decisions as to . . . 
what objec t ions to make . . . are general ly l e f t to the 
profess iona l judgment of counse l • • £iflJfc£_2-*J3£Clilia# 56 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 17 , 18 (1987) aliasing Stfltfi_JU_HQQd, 648 P.2d 71,91 (Otah 
1982) . Before the d e f i c i e n c i e s enumerated by a defendant w i l l 
r e s u l t in reversa l i t must appear that they were p r e j u d i c i a l , or 
in other words, that without the errors , there was a reasonable 
l i k e l i h o o d of a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t . CQdianD3-2jL_MflIJLiS, 660 P.2d 
1101, 1109 (Otah 1983); ££aJfc£-XA_EQLSX£il, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Dtah 
1977); a a M B i l l f l J U J u m f i l f 24 Otah 2d 19 , 2 2 , 465 P.2d 343, 345 
(1970); SlSif i -Xx-Sia*, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Otah 1979) . 
In the instant case, given that defendant was found in 
the area of the crimes carrying a screwdriver and items that were 
taken from the Frampton1s (money, a set of Ford keys and a 
calculator key chain), there is no reasonable likelihood of a 
different result if trial counsel had raised the issues defendant 
complains about. The Frampton's testified that coins and bills 
were missing from their cars and home (R. 116, 145). Defendant 
carried $39 in bills (Mrs. Frampton was missing between $30 and 
$50 dollars) and $2.66 in coin (Jason Frampton was missing an 
undetermined amount of coin) • Mrs. Frampton positively 
identified the calculator defendant carried at the time of his 
arrest as hers and matched the Ford key to her own ignition key 
that was missing from her purse after the burglary (R. 147, 148-
150). 
Nearly all of the objections and issues defendant now 
claims could have been raised go to the question of identity. 
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Given tbat defendant was found in possession of tbe missing 
property, it is unlikely tbat even it all of tbe identification 
evidence bad been excluded or impeached defendant would have been 
acquitted of tbe crimes charged. Moreover, it is likely that 
both witnesses would still have been allowed to identify 
defendant at trial even if their previous identifications were 
excluded from evidence. Perhaps trial counsel felt, as a matter 
of strategy, it was best to allow the identifications to come 
before the jury and use the opportunity to impeach with 
inconsistencies to reduce the credibility of an anticipated in-
court identification* Counsel did raise these inconsistencies 
before the jury even if she failed to introduce the prior 
inconsistent statement defendant alludes to. From the record, it 
is impossible to determine whether the witness had actually made 
such a statement or whether counsel was merely engaging in artful 
cross-examination to imply that the testimony was inconsistent 
with previous statements. 
A lawyer's "legitimate exercise of judgment" 
in the choice of trial strategy or tactics 
that did not produce the anticipated result 
does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
£fidianna# 660 P.2d at 1109 cijtins SJtai£_5U-McHi£ttl# 554 P.2d 203, 
205 (Utah 1976) . 
Counsel also pointed out to the jury through cross-
examination that tbe officers told the witnesses that they found 
defendant in the area (R. 125, 168) and that defendant fit the 
general description they had provided (R. 126, 168). She further 
brought out the short period of time both witnesses viewed the 
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person at the time of the crimes and the poor quality of lighting 
available* These factors could have been used by the jury to 
discount the victims9 identification of defendant in light of the 
lengthy instruction she offered on the frailties of eye-witness 
identification that the court gave in substance (R. 101-102)• 
Defendant also complains that counsel did not ask why 
fingerprints were not taken at the Trijillo home. She did, 
however, ask Mr. Trijillo whether prints were taken (R. 169) 
raising an inference of police neglect and the possibility of an 
identity error. Had she questioned the officers, their response 
may have cancelled out the inference by providing a reasonable 
explanation such as the number of other fingerprints that were 
already on the door from sources other than the burglar. 
Even though counsel may also have objected to the 
hearsay from Mr. and Mrs. Frampton about what Jason said when he 
identified defendant that night, this too was non-prejudicial. 
Jason had already testified about his comments and was thoroughly 
cross-examined on the issue. His parents9 repetition of his 
comments was merely cumulative at that point and harmless in 
light of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See 
CAliiaini3_y*_fij:££D# 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970); S*fl.t£-X.*-itelS2i)t 
725 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Utah 1986). 
Finally, while Mr. Trijillofs reference to anotner 
robber who tried to rape his sister was unfortunate, it does not 
appear that defendant was prejudiced by the reference. From the 
record, it was clear that the witness was referring to another 
person and an entirely separate incident in attempting to explain 
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why he was sleeping on the couch near the sliding glass door that 
night rather than in his bedroom (R. 156). Since defendant did 
not gain entry to Trijillo's home and there were no sexually 
related charges, it does not appear that the jury would have 
applied the comment to defendant or the circumstances of this 
case. Had defense counsel objected, she may have focused the 
jury's attention on the remark and most likely chose to allow 
them to forget it, if possible* 
While it is easy in retrospect for appellate counsel to 
find things that could have been done differently, the record in 
this case reveals that defendant received "the skill, judgment 
and diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney." Dyet 
JU-CtifiP* 613 P.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc). 
Consequently, defendant is not entitled to a new trial. 
CQHCLSSlOfl 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to atfirm defendant's conviction and deny his request for a new 
trial. 
DATED this ^JzfL- day of June, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
X/'SANDRA %>SJOG£EN 
(-^ Ass i s tant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that on the cj^ jft day ot June, 1987, I 
caused to be hand delivered four (4) true and exact copies of the 
above and foregoing BRIEF OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL to each of 
the following counsel of record: 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr. 
The Judge Building 
No. 8 East Broadway 
Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Steven L. Hansen 
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